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Abstract 
Increasingly, states are including environmental rights as human rights either in their Constitutions or 
in other human rights legislation.  South Africa, a relatively young democracy, entrenched the right 
to a healthy environment in section 24 of its Constitution.  This section states that everyone has the 
right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being.  Moreover everyone has the 
right to the protection of the environment to ensure inter-generational justice, balanced with the aim 
of justifiable economic and social development.  Little more than a decade later, and with several 
Acts of Parliament further, the question needs to be asked whether and to what extent this right has 
been given practical content.  It is found that the South African legislature and judiciary have been 
robust in their enforcement and interpretation of both the constitutional right to a clean and healthy 
environment, as well as the legislation enacted to give effect to this right.  From this developing 
nation perspective, the paper then examines the Netherlands as an example a developed country 
where such a right is also recognised as a human right.  Despite a longstanding reputation of judicial 
activism on, and popular ease of access to, environmental justice in this country, it is found that this 
tradition is facing a serious political and governmental threat which is only obviated by the 
Netherlands‟ accession to European legislation.  The paper concludes that, from these examples, it is 
clear that the enforceability of constitutionally protected environmental rights depend to a large 
extent on the way in which the right itself is constituted and classified, and that in both instances the 
support of both the judicial and the executive branches of the trias politica are crucial in order for the 
constitutionalisation itself to be of practical significance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From as far back as 1972 the link between human rights and the environment has been recognised:  
The first principle of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
1
  
(the Stockholm Declaration) states that:-   
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a 
solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future 
generations. 
 
Since then it seems logical that this right has increasingly featured in national and international law.
2
  
 
Bearing this in mind, it should be stated at the outset that this paper agrees with, and takes as a 
starting point the premise that constitutional protection of the environment, and even better, 
constitutional protection of the environment as a fundamental human right, is a sensible idea.  
Commentators have already made compelling arguments as to why constitutions should provide for 
the protection of the environment as a human right.
3
  In fact, as far as the protection of the 
environment is concerned, constitutional rights could be of crucial importance, mainly because in 
most instances such rights are inalienable and built into the nation‟s legal system. 4   In principle, also, 
inalienable fundamental rights offer individuals the potential of challenging state decisions that may 
amount to violations of the constitution.  Fundamental rights could also provide a framework for 
legislation to be drafted in, as well as goals for governments to achieve.
5
 
 
On the one had in certain countries, notably South American states, fundamental environmental 
rights are seen to be self-executing and enforceable.
6
  These, however, are in the minority, with most 
jurisdictions requiring further delegated legislation and/or sometimes placing insurmountable hurdles 
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before would-be litigants. May points out that „...of the 130 constitutions that address the 
environment, only about sixty grant individuals what may fairly be characterized as a fundamental 
right to a “clean,” “healthful,” or “favourable” environment.‟7  Moreover, out of these sixty very few 
make the leap from theory to practice by granting to individuals and/or organisations legally 
enforceable rights.  Thus, while many nations generically address the environment in their 
constitutions, few of them actually embody fundamental environmental rights. This is an important 
distinction, as constitutionally entrenched fundamental rights are generally more unassailable than 
mere procedural norms or statements of policy and tend to be less subject to political whims.
 
 
 
Human rights have traditionally been categorized into three broad groups:  First generation or civil 
and political rights; second generation or economic, social and cultural rights; and third generation or 
solidarity rights.
8
  Civil and political rights are the most enforceable and „core‟ right of all the human 
rights, and refer to the individual and her rights in society, both vis-à-vis authority and other citizens.  
Examples include the right to life, the right to freedom of expression and the right to personal liberty.   
Economic, social and cultural rights tend to represent goals that states should try and achieve for 
their citizens.  As such they focus on both individuals and communities.  Examples include the right 
to health and education.  Finally, third generation rights, the least enforceable of them all, relate to 
issues such as peace and development and usually involve organs of state and private and 
international bodies.  The focus here is mostly on groups or communities of people rather than the 
individual.   
 
Turner makes the following useful distinction between „substantive‟ and „procedural‟ rights:  The 
former „…would entitle the holder to a specific quality of environment‟ while the latter „…would 
entitle the holder to processes such as: appropriate access to information concerning the environment, 
participation in decision-making processes and access to justice relating to environmental matters.‟ 9 
 
Potentially, environmental rights can fall within each, or several, of the generations or classifications 
of human rights.  Looking at these distinctions in more detail it may well be argued that an 
unenforceable right is hardly a right at all.  How then do constitutionalising environmental rights in 
the two ways described above translate to the woman on the street who directly feels the effects of 
environmental degradation?  In what follows, an example of both modes of constitutionalising 
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environmental rights will be examined.  The South African example looks at the enforceability of an 
environmental right that has been constitutionalised as directly enforceable (substantive) human right, 
while the Dutch example looks at  the enforceability of a fundamental environmental right that is 
constitutionalised mainly as a governmental aim (a procedural right).  
 
SECTION A 
 
2. SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
South Africa is a country rich in natural wealth. For example, it is ranked as the world‟s third most 
biologically diverse country, and 80% of its 18,000 plant species occur nowhere else on earth.  It 
contains areas of breathtaking natural beauty and world renowned protected areas.  However, it is 
also a country that ranks as the eighth highest global per capita emitter of CO2 and one that is 
threatened by incipient water scarcity.  It further faces severe socio-economic challenges, with 
increased urbanisation and growing population numbers adding additional strain and demands.
10
  As 
a developing country, one of its main challenges is to redress not only the historical inequalities left 
over from the Apartheid regime, but to try and reverse current extreme inequalities that have 
seemingly only deepened since democratization. 
 
In most African states, fundamental/constitutionalised environmental rights have yet to be found 
enforceable directly by individuals.  South Africa is the noticeable exception, with a fundamental 
environmental right firmly entrenched in section 24 of its Constitution.
11
  The South African 
Constitution, adopted in its final form two years after democratization, is the supreme law of South 
Africa, and any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid.
12
  Chapter 2 of the Constitution 
contains the Bill of Rights, which is the cornerstone of the South African democracy.  All organs of 
the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights
13
 and furthermore, 
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the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all 
organs of state.
14
 
 
However, none of the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 2 is absolute.  Section 36 contains 
instructions as to how and when a fundamental right may be limited.  It states that a right may only 
be limited in terms of a law of general application, and then only to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom.  The following then need to be taken into account:  the nature of the right; the importance 
and purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation between the 
limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
2.2  Wording of the right 
 
Section 24 of the Constitution says:  
 [24]  Everyone has the right –  
a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and  
b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that 
i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
ii) promote conservatism; and 
iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources 
while promoting justifiable economic and social development. 
 
Section 24 does not confer an absolute right to a clean and unpolluted environment, but recognises 
that pollution is inevitable in an industrialized society.
15
  The section refers to health as well as well-
being.  The latter is a wider concept than „health‟, and is therefore open to wide environmental 
interpretation.  In Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts 
Products and Others (Hichange)
16
 the High Court (albeit indirectly) endorsed the idea that the 
environment itself may have an intrinsic value to people. 
 
2.3 Application and ranking of the right  
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It can justly be said that s 24 provides the foundation for all environmental efforts in South Africa.
17
  
Because it is a fundamental right contained in the highest law of South Africa, it means that 
individuals can assert the right at all levels including and up to the highest South African 
adjudicating body, the Constitutional Court.  Section 24 can justly be interpreted as containing both a 
fundamental justiciable right in sub-section (a); and a socio-economic right in sub-section (b).
18
 
 
Section 8 states that the Bill of Rights applies to all law in South Africa, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of the State, and binds not only the state, but also natural and 
juristic persons.  As „everyone‟ as meant in s 24 includes all human beings, this means that 
corporations may be sued by individuals or groups in an action based on s 24.   S 24 is therefore 
applicable both vertically and horizontally. 
 
It is also clear that the environmental right is on par with other socio-economic rights in the Bill of 
Rights.  Where competing interests and norms are concerned, a balancing of rights will be required.  
In BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Agriculture, Conservation and Land Affairs
19
 (BP 
Southern Africa), the court stressed that not only is s 24 „on a par with the right to freedom of trade, 
occupation, profession and property entrenched in ss 22 and 25 of the Constitution‟, but that „[t]he 
balancing of environmental interests with justifiable economic and social development is to be 
conceptualised well beyond the interests of the present living generation.‟20  
 
2.4 Locus standi and participatory governance 
 
2.4.1 Locus standi 
 
Before the Constitution came into effect, South African common law, notably the law of delict, 
dictated that only persons whose rights were directly affected or who were actually or potentially 
harmed by an action, could bring a suit.  Section 38 of the Constitution has now broadened this with 
the effect that public interest litigation, which characterises a significant portion of environmental 
suits, is recognised for the first time.
21
  Section 38 provides that: 
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[38] Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that 
a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant 
appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a 
court are –  
a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
 
Section 32 of the National Environmental Management Act
22
 (NEMA) mirrors this.  Furthermore, 
subsequent actions brought by, among others, environmental authorities
23
 and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs)
24
 bear testimony to the increased access to courts in environmental matters 
allowed by section 38. 
 
2.4.2 Participatory Governance 
 
The Constitution specifically recognises public access to and participation in the law-making 
process.
25
 
 
Section 165 of the constitution prescribes that: 
(1) The judicial authority of the Republic is vested in the courts. 
(2) The courts are independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which 
they must apply impartially and without fear, favour or prejudice. 
(3) No person or organ of state may interfere with the functioning of the courts. 
(4) Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the 
courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and 
effectiveness of the courts. 
(5) An order or decision issued by a court binds all persons to whom and organs of state 
to which it applies. 
 
It is important to note that s 165(2) empowers the courts to declare unconstitutional legislation 
unlawful, as unconstitutional law is perceived as unlawful per se. 
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2.5 Legislation enacted to give form and content to the right 
 
The principal environmental framework statute enacted in South Africa is the National 
Environmental Management Act (NEMA) referred to above.  This Act accords the ability to 
participate in environmental governance directly to the public.  Section 32 states that everyone has 
legal standing to enforce environmental laws, while several other sections ensure, inter alia, 
promotion of participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance, as well 
as the inclusion of vulnerable and disadvantaged persons (s 2(4)(f); access to information (s 2(4)(k)); 
recognition of the vital role of women and youth in environmental management (s 2(4)(q)); and 
finally government has to ensure adequate and appropriate opportunity for public participation in 
decisions that may affect the environment (s 32(2)(d)). 
 
However, as has been pointed out by commentators, just because the legal framework enables 
interested and affected parties to participate in environmental decision-making, it does not 
necessarily mean that this happens in practice.
26
  One has to remember that South Africa is a 
developing country where lack of resources is a constant constraint.  As one writer commented: 
 
The poor and marginal suffer the brunt of environmental pollution and natural resource 
degradation.  Indeed they often suffer outright expropriation of land, forests, fisheries 
and other natural resources.  Moreover, because the rights of the poor to have a political 
voice receives the least protection, they are often the least able to press for just 
compensation – or to just say „no‟ to unwanted development.27  
 
The poor in South Africa certainly do not find themselves in a more favourable situation than those 
in most other developing countries. Furthermore, from what follows it will be seen that the 
participatory right is not always consistently recognised or enforced by the courts. 
 
2.6 Case law  
 
Since the enactment of the Constitution, South African courts at all levels, right up to the 
Constitutional Court, have not hesitated to interpret and enforce the environmental right contained in 
s 24.  The contexts in which s 24 came into play were as diverse as considering economic versus 
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environmental matters,
28
 sustainability and governmental responsibility,
29
 and corporate 
governance,
30
 amongst others.  In what follows a selection of decisions considering s 24 is examined.  
For ease of reference, case discussions will be grouped thematically. 
 
2.6.1 Sustainability and inter-generational equity 
 
In BP Southern Africa
31
 the applicant sought permission to construct a new petrol filling station from 
the defendant.  In order to obtain permission, it had to conduct an environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) in terms of the predecessor to NEMA.
32
  Based on the EIA, the Department for Agriculture, 
Conservation and Land Affairs refused permission for the development to proceed.  The applicant 
contended that the Department‟s refusal was mainly one based on attempts to regulate the economy 
(as there were already two other filling stations near the proposed site of the applicant‟s 
development).
33
  The Department on the other hand contended that its main motivation in refusing to 
authorise the development was environmental, and that in so doing it was fulfilling, amongst others, 
its mandate in terms of the Constitution.   
 
In interpreting s 24, the High Court stated that the environmental right should be ranked equally with 
the rights to freedom of trade, occupation, profession and property contained in ss 22 and 23 of the 
Constitution, and that these rights should be balanced.  However, in doing so, „[t]he balancing of 
environmental interests with justifiable economic and social development is to be conceptualized 
well beyond the interests of the present living generations‟ as s 24(b) states that the environment 
should be protected for both present and future generations.
34
  
 
The court spelled it out in so many words: 
 
Development, which may be regarded as economically and financially sound, will, in 
future, be balanced by its environmental impact, taking coherent cognisance of the 
principle of intergenerational equity and sustainable use of resources in order to arrive at 
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an integrated management of the environment, sustainable development and socio-
economic concerns.  By elevating the environment to a fundamental justiciable right, 
South Africa has irreversibly embarked on a road, which will lead to the goal of attaining 
a protected environment by an integrated approach, which takes into consideration, inter 
alia, socio-economic concerns and principles.
35
 
 
In In Re Kranspoort Community
36
 (Kranspoort) the South African Land Claims Court (tasked with 
the restitution of land expropriated from communities during the Apartheid rule), in its ruling 
restoring land to an applicant community, did so subject to certain conditions aimed at eliminating 
the risk of unsustainable depletion of renewable resources on the land, stating that such an 
interpretation of the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 “…‟promotes the spirit purports and 
objects‟ of s 24(b) of the Constitution „and that such conditions would ensure equal access to the 
restored asset also by younger members of the community in the future‟.37 
 
2.6.2 Administrative law aspect of the right: the right to be heard 
 
Three years after the enactment of the Constitution, the South African Supreme Court of Appeal 
addressed an administrative issue related to s 24 in Director: Mineral Development, Gauteng Region 
and SASOL Mining (Pty) Ltd v Save the Vaal Environment and Others
38
(Save the Vaal).  The oil 
company Sasol planned to expand coal mining activities next to the Vaal River, which provides 
water to the densely populated Johannesburg and its metropolitan surroundings.  The respondents 
were a concerned citizens group.  Before issuing a licence to Sasol, the Department of Minerals and 
Energy did not give the citizens‟ group an opportunity to raise their concerns about, inter alia, the 
possible destruction of a wetland; pollution; loss of water quality; decrease of property values; and 
the threat to flora and fauna posed by the proposed development.
39
   
 
Amongst others, the appeal centred on the question whether interested and/or affected parties had a 
right to be heard by the licensing body (i.e. an administrative law question relating to the South 
African administrative law principle of audi alteram partem), as well as whether they had the right to 
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raise environmental objections to the grant of the license.
40
  The respondents contended that the 
constitutional entitlement to the environment contained in s 24 would be prejudiced by the grant of a 
licence by the Director.
41
  The court agreed with them, stating that: 
Our Constitution, by including environmental rights as fundamental, justiciable human 
rights, by necessary implication requires that environmental considerations be accorded 
appropriate recognition and respect in the administrative processes in our country.  
Together with the change in the ideological climate must also come a change in our 
legal and administrative approach to environmental concerns.
42
 
 
It has to be pointed out that s 39 of the Constitution assures the right to just administrative action and 
that since 2000 the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
43
 (PAJA) has further fleshed out the 
right, leading to a proliferation of challenges to the decisions of environmental authorities.
44
 
 
2.6.3 Scope of the right to environmental „well-being‟ 
 
In Hichange Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Produce Company (Pty) Ltd t/a Pelts Products and 
Others
45
 (Hichange) the High Court examined the scope of the right to environmental „well-being‟. 
Hichange Investments was the owner of land adjacent to that of Cape Produce, whose tannery 
business produced a number of chemical waste products.  At issue, inter alia, was the interpretation 
of s 28 of NEMA, which states:  
Every person who causes…significant pollution or degradation of the environment must 
take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from occurring, 
continuing or recurring, or, in so far as such harm to the environment is authorized by law 
or cannot reasonably be avoided or stopped, to minimize and rectify such pollution or 
degradation of the environment. 
 
In interpreting the phrase “significant pollution” the court referred to s 24 of the Constitution and 
found that the right to well-being is relevant in the pollution context in that it encompasses a sense of 
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environmental integrity which entails the idea that the environment ought to be used in a „morally 
responsible, considered and ethical manner.‟46  
 
2.6.4 Development and sustainable development 
 
The importance of sustainability of development was also emphasised in BP Southern Africa and 
Kranspoort discussed above. But one of the most significant and far-reaching judgements on the 
environmental right and its contents was that of the Constitutional Court in Fuel Retailers 
Association of Southern Africa v Director General Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment Mpumalanga Province
47
 (Fuel Retailers).  
 
The facts of Fuel Retailers are similar to those of BP Southern Africa.  An environmental authority 
had granted a permit to a developer to build a new petrol station in an area where similar filling 
stations already existed.  The applicant appealed against this decision, first to the High Court, then to 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.  In both instances the appeal failed.  The applicant then appealed to 
the Constitutional Court relying on the provisions of section 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution
 
as well as 
sections 2 and
 
23
 
of NEMA.  The Constitutional Court upheld the appeal on various grounds, 
including the fact that the relevant authority did not exercise its duty under NEMA to consider the 
impact of the proposed filling station on socio-economic conditions but instead effectively delegated 
the decision to the local authority, whose prior (purely town planning motivated) decision to rezone 
the relevant area was seen as sufficient consideration for the environmental authority.
48
 The court 
added that regardless of what the applicant‟s motive in raising an objection was (it seems trite that its 
primary motivation was to protect its own economic interests), valid legal objections were raised that 
had to be considered by both the environmental authority as well as the courts.   
 
On the potential conflict of interests, be they economic, social or environmental, the court 
emphasised the balancing role of the notion of sustainable development: 
Our Constitution does not sanction a state of normative anarchy which may arise 
where potentially conflicting principles are juxtaposed. It requires those who 
enforce and implement the Constitution to find a balance between potentially 
conflicting principles. It is founded on the notion of proportionality which enables 
this balance to be achieved. Yet in other situations, it offers a principle that will 
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facilitate the achievement of the balance. The principle that enables the 
environmental authorities to balance developmental needs and environmental 
concerns is the principle of sustainable development.
49
 
 
The Constitutional Court thereby confirmed the centrality of the notion of sustainable development.  
Of particular importance for a developing nation such as South Africa, is the question where 
environmental concerns should be ranked vis-à-vis developmental needs.  Recognising the 
importance of economic and social development, the court took pains to point out that this is not an 
overriding aim: development cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental base, and promotion 
of development requires the protection of the environment. 
50
 
 
Furthermore, in an aside the court severely criticised government departments with failing to 
exercise due care in considering the environmental impact of this proposed development, and stated 
that proper exercise of the precautionary principle should have obliged them to do so.
51
  
 
2.6.5 Judicial activism? 
 
In Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company Ltd and Others
52
 
(Stilfontein) the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry ordered the respondents (the directors of a 
gold mining company) to follow certain directives in terms of s 19 of the National Water Act 36 of 
1998 in mopping up their gold mining activities.  Failure to do so would have led to severe pollution 
of water resources, damage to property and even, possibly, loss of life.  The respondents failed to 
comply with the order, and the applicants lodged an urgent application to the High Court for an order 
declaring the mines in contempt of court. 
 
Shortly before the hearing was set to take place, all the directors of the respondent had resigned en 
masse.  In terms of South African corporate law, a corporate entity such as a mining concern is a 
legal entity in its own right, with directors and shareholders separated from it by a „corporate veil‟.  
Resigning, therefore, would theoretically have absolved the directors from liability.  The court, 
however, would have none of it and held that the directors „…cannot be allowed to merely walk 
away because it is convenient for themselves to do so‟.53  
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The court found that, based on amongst others the environmental right contained in s 24, the 
respondents were to be held responsible.  In coming to this conclusion, the court stated that: 
Unless Courts are prepared to assist the State by providing suitable mechanisms for the 
enforcement of statutory obligations an impression will be created that mining companies 
are free to exploit the mineral resources of the country for the profit over the lifetime of 
the mine, thereafter they may simply walk away from their environmental obligations.  
This simply cannot be permitted in a constitutional democracy which recognizes the right 
of all citizens to be protected from the effects of pollution and degradation.
54
 
 
(It is unfortunate, to say the least, that on appeal the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned this 
decision in Kebble v Minister of Water Affairs.
55
) 
 
A year after the High Court decision in Stilfontein, the Constitutional Court in Fuel Retailers
56
 
concluded that it is primarily the judiciary‟s role to ensure that sustainability is reflected in 
environmental authorities‟ practices.  Furthermore, it pointed out that this is a mandate placed upon 
courts by the Johannesburg Principles which were adopted by the Global Judges Symposium
57
 at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002. 
 
It therefore seems that the courts‟ role as watchdog in environmental and/or sustainability issues is 
seen by the courts not as judicial activism, but rather as a judicial duty placed upon them by the 
Constitution and confirmed by the Johannesburg Principles mentioned above.   
 
2.6.6 Balancing conflicting rights 
 
In Petro Props (Pty) Ltd v Barlow and Another (Petro Props)
58
 the respondent in her capacity as 
chairperson of an environmental NGO opposed the development of a petrol station on land owned by 
the applicant, due to its possible detrimental effects on a neighbouring wetland.  To this end she 
launched a media campaign and held a number of public meetings.  The applicant sought an interdict 
against her alleging unfair infringement on its right to use and enjoy its property.  The respondent in 
her turn relied on the right to freedom of expression which is protected by s 16 of the Constitution, as 
well as the environmental right in s 24.  Although the High Court upon evaluating the relevant 
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competing fundamental rights in the case stated that in the context of this case, the environment right 
in section 24 is subsumed under a debate on freedom of expression,
59
 it nevertheless found in favour 
of the respondent.  Importantly, praising the selfless nature of the Respondent‟s actions, the court 
stated that: 
…it should be borne in mind that the Constitution does not only afford a shield to be 
resorted to passively and defensively.  It also provides a sword, which groups like the 
Association can and should draw to empower their initiatives and interests.
60
 
 
 
However, it seems that even the South African Constitutional Court is not above political expediency.  
In Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 
(Kyalami),
61
 the Constitutional Court had to weigh up the environmental right against the right to 
access to housing, which is contained in s 26 of the Constitution.  Residents of an area adjacent to 
government owned land in Kyalami objected to the resettlement of flood victims to a transit camp on 
the land based on the fact, inter alia, that the camp could pose significant environmental risks to the 
area.  The court avoided directly addressing the conflict of the two constitutional rights and instead 
focused solely on interpreting NEMA, in terms of which it upheld the government‟s decision to 
establish the transit camp.  This decision was criticised by commentators as it seemed that it had 
„…purposively misconstrued the enabling environmental regime to achieve a socially and politically 
satisfactory outcome.‟62  It was also speculated that the decision was the result of judicial error.63 
 
2.7 Summary 
 
From the above it is clear that the courts have addressed the environmental right on several occasions, 
and have thereby given body to the right.  As stated by Ngcobo J in the Constitutional Court: 
„Courts … have a crucial role to play in the protection of the environment. When the need arises to 
intervene in order to protect the environment, they should not hesitate to do so.‟64 
 
                                                          
59
 Petro Props (n 58)  Para. 73. 
60
 Ibid.  Para. 55. 
61
 Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Others 2001 (3) SA 1151 CC. 
62
 M A Kidd, „Greening the Judiciary‟ (2006) 3 Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal  3 
<www.puk.ac.za/fakulteite/regte/per/issue06v3.html>  accessed 26 August 2009. 
63
 See Kotzé and Paterson (n 10) 578 and M A Kidd, „The Constitutional Court‟s Dilution of NEMA: Minister of Public 
Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association and Another‟ (2001) 8 South African Journal of 
Environmental Law and Practice 119-127. 
64
 Fuel Retailers (n 47) Para. 104. 
 16 
But, are the South African courts going far enough?  And are they always consistent in interpreting 
and enforcing what amounts to one of the most liberal constitutionally protected environmental 
rights in the world?  Kotzé points out that, based mainly on the court‟s reasoning in Fuel Retailers, it 
is to be expected that South African courts, who had in the past been reluctant to intervene in 
executive matters, may increasingly become directly involved „where environmental rights are not 
adequately protected and enforced by government.‟65 It is submitted that this does not necessarily 
mean a blurring of the separation of powers in terms of the trias politica doctrine, but signals a shift 
to both judicial and executive adherence and submission to the supremacy of the Constitution. 
 
On the other hand the role of the judiciary can be criticized.  Feris points out that there are relatively 
few instances where the courts attempted a really in-depth conceptualisation of the right, and in some 
instances courts avoided addressing the matter at all.
66
  The reason for this seems to be that the 
judiciary on occasion tend to resolve potentially constitutional matters on procedural rather than 
substantive grounds.
67
  
 
Nevertheless, given the relative youth of both the South African democracy and the constitutional 
right contained in its constitution, it is submitted that on balance the courts show a favourable 
disposition towards interpreting and enforcing s 24.   
 
Furthermore, it seems as if the South African government is increasingly taking environmental 
protection seriously. This was evidenced by the creation of a new South African Environmental 
Management Inspectorate (EMI).  The EMI is a network of environmental enforcement officials 
from different government departments (national, provincial and municipal), created upon the 
amendment to NEMA on 1 May 2005, and tasked with monitoring compliance with and enforcing 
the EMI as well as related legislation.
68
   
 
It is early yet to evaluate the possible impact of the replacement of Thabo Mbeki by Jacob Zuma as 
president of the RSA, but it may be taken as an encouraging sign that the new government, in its 
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Medium Term Strategic Framework (MTSF)
69
 stated as strategic priority number nine the 
sustainable use and management of resources.
70
  This is coupled with the next strategic priority, 
which is to build „a developmental state including improvement of public services and strengthening 
democratic institutions, which in turn includes building partnership with society and strengthening 
democratic institutions‟.71 
 
SECTION B 
 
3. THE NETHERLANDS  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy. Its political and judicial system is predicated on the 
separation of powers following the trias politica model, which includes the principle of legality.  The 
idea that government action must be based on prior general rules laid down by a democratic 
legislature; that there must be independent judicial review of government activities; and that 
fundamental human rights must be recognised is considered to be a requirement for the rule of law.
72
 
 
The Netherlands is a highly industrialized and densely populated country with the usual array of 
environmental issues this brings about.
73
 In addition to this, the country is unique in that a large 
proportion (almost half) of its land mass lies below sea level, bringing about further environmental 
challenges.  It is not surprising, therefore, that the Netherlands had a reputation for environmental 
activism, also in its judiciary.
74
 But recently, it seems that this tradition is being seriously challenged.  
What is the status of environmental rights in the Netherlands today? 
 
Chapter 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2002 sets out certain fundamental 
rights, including, in article 21, protection of the environment.  However, despite the inclusion of an 
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environmental right under the chapeau of „fundamental rights‟, the reality about the nature of this 
„fundamental‟ right seems to be somewhat different.  May points out that some Western European 
countries have declined to elevate constitutional procedural rights into fundamental environmental 
rights and that courts in the Netherlands have in their turn declined to infer fundamental rights into 
constitutional provisions requiring sound environmental policy.
75
 
 
What, then, is the status of article 21?  Is it a case of form rather than substance, as far as justiciable 
environmental rights are concerned in the Netherlands?   
 
3.2 Wording of the right 
 
Chapter 1, article 21 of the Dutch Constitution states: „It shall be the concern of the authorities to 
keep the country habitable and to protect and improve the environment.‟  
 
The Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs clarifies the Dutch interpretation of the difference between 
„classic‟ and „social‟ fundamental rigts: The former, such as the right to freedom of expression, is 
directly enforceable by the citizen and places a negative (non-intervening) duty on government.  The 
latter, such as the environmental right, is characterised as entailing an active duty placed on 
government, with the other side of the coin being a „revendication‟ or expectation by citizens that 
such governmental duty will be carried out.  Put another way, they can be viewed as 
„instructienormen‟:  „...instructions addressed to the public authorities to take certain action to 
promote the economic, social and cultural well-being of subjects.‟ 76   Importantly, such 
“instructienormen” are not directly justiciable or enforceable by citizens. 77    This corresponds to the 
classification of first and second generation rights discussed above.  It is trite that article 21 falls in 
the second category. 
 
3.3 Application and ranking of the right 
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Although four ministers
78
 share responsibility for national environmental policy in the Netherlands, 
primary responsibility for environmental matters lays with the Minister for Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment.  At provincial and municipal level, administrative authorities 
implement environmental policies and laws.  Because most environmental matters in the Netherlands 
fall within the scope of administrative law, most such cases are adjudicated by administrative sectors 
within the Dutch District Courts, with possible appeals going to the Administrative Law Division of 
the Council of State.  Environmental issues can also be addressed in the civil or criminal courts such 
as the District Courts, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court (except for criminal matters.)
79
 
 
3.4 Legislation enacted to give form and content to the right 
 
Article 21 tasks the government with the duty to care for the protection and improvement of the 
environment, a task which it has so far fulfilled mainly by enacting legislation.  Legislation in this 
sense includes also delegated legislation both at the level of central government (ministerial 
ordinances) and regulation by decentralized bodies.  Furthermore, EU law exercises a heavy 
influence.  The most important environmental statute is the Environmental Management Act 
(EMA)
80
 supplemented by a range of sectoral Acts, such as for example the Air Pollution Act.
81
  At 
present, therefore, various Acts govern an environmental permit system – this is foreseen to be 
consolidated to a “one stop shop” regime when the Environmental Law (General Provision) Act and 
the Water Act come into effect.
82
 
 
3.5 Limiting access to environmental justice 
 
Of course, having robust statutory environmental protection becomes meaningless when prospective 
litigants are effectively denied standing through a plethora of procedural and jurisdictional hurdles – 
and this seems to be the emerging trend in recent years in the Netherlands. 
 
3.5.1 Legislative changes and the demise of the environmental actio popularis 
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Verschuuren shows how, since 2005, two developments have led to the narrowing of access to 
environmental justice.  The first development relates to procedural aspects.  Before 2005, 
administrative actions impacting on the environment (mostly decisions about granting permits) were 
subject to a special procedure called the „extensive public preparation procedure‟, while others were 
taken under the „public preparation procedure‟.  These have now been integrated into one procedure 
called the „uniform public preparation procedure‟.  This has significantly limited access to courts in 
environmental matters.
 83
 The second development was the abolition of the Dutch environmental 
actio popularis. 
 
The General Administrative Law Act
84
 (GALA) provides procedural rules for administrative law, 
which is the area of law under which most environmental matters fall to be adjudicated in the 
Netherlands.
85
   Until 2005, access to adjudication in this area was very broad: there existed an 
indirect actio popularis in Dutch environmental law in procedures against environmental permits.  In 
practice, anyone could bring an action against the granting of an environmental permit.
86
  More 
specifically, as long as a person, group, or NGO had entered the decision-making process relating to 
the permit, they also had a right to subsequently go to court, provided they objected on the grounds 
put forward by them in the decision-making process.
87
  In 2005, the EMA was amended
88
 restricting 
this – in effect, after 25 years‟ existence, the actio popularis was thereby abolished.  This was the 
result mainly of a fierce political debate in which it was argued that environmental NGOs and 
citizens had too much power in environmental decision-making, often hampering governmental 
attempts to stimulate the economy.
89
   
 
The procedure regulating locus standi in administrative tribunals now operates like this: A uniform 
public preparation procedure regulates the decision-making process on applications for all 
environmental permits.  Article 8.1 of the EMA forbids setting up, operating or changing 
installations that might have adverse effects on the environment, unless one has a permit to do so 
issued by the competent authority.  At the decision-making stage, anyone can object to the grant of 
such a permit.  However (after the 2005 amendment of the GALA), at later stages this is not the case.  
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Once the uniform public participation procedure has been completed, the matter can be appealed to 
the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (directly, without having to object to the 
relevant administrative authority first).  However, this right is reserved for interested parties only.
90
  
„Interested parties‟ are defined as „…those people that can show a special interest in the decision.‟91    
 
The obvious question here is: Who exactly would be an „interested party‟?  Is it only the company 
applying for the permit, the relevant authority, and people near the proposed site of the business?  Or 
could it be interpreted wider?  Article 1:2 of GALA states that an interested party means the person 
whose interest is directly affected by an order.  Subsection 3 of article 1:2 further states, regarding 
legal persons: „...their interests are deemed to include the general and collective interests which they 
specially represent in accordance with their objectives and as evidenced by their actual activities.‟   
 
In general, case law shows that courts leaned towards favouring NGOs in interpreting this clause.
92
  
In other words, until recently it has been presumed in the Netherlands that environmental NGOs do 
have an interest that would qualify them as „interested parties‟.  However it is worrying to note that it 
was suggested in the Dutch Parliament that this presumption should be dropped.
93
  The courts seem 
willing to comply: on 1 October 2008 the Judicial Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State 
[Afdeling Bestuursrecht, Raad van Staaten] ruled against the admissibility of an environmental NGO 
in terms of s 1:2(3).
94
 (For a more detailed discussion of this ruling see 5.3 below.)  Thus the 
tendency in the Netherlands seems to be a political (and juridical) consensus that the role of 
environmental interest groups should be decreased.
95
   
 
It therefore seems that access to environmental justice is being curtailed (or at the very least there is a 
serious attempt by the legislature to try and do this) by narrowing the criteria for standing.  It must 
also be noted that there is yet a further way in which access is being limited, namely by severely 
curtailing the number of decisions against which appeal is possible at all.  Verschuuren points out 
that: 
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[t]hese [environmental decisions which cannot be appealed] include all forms of 
legislation, including orders in council, ministerial orders and also national environmental 
policy plans…in many cases environmental permits have been replaced by general rules 
for certain categories of installations, laid down in orders in council (75% of all 
installations no longer need a permit)…[Therefore] this can be criticised from the point 
of view of access to justice.
96
 
 
This limiting of access to adjudication has been criticised on a variety of grounds, not least that it 
may well be contrary to the implementation of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention), which aims at improving access to environmental justice, and which the Netherlands 
had ratified through approval in February 2008.
 97
    As far as limiting access of environmental NGOs 
(as has been called for in the Dutch parliament), this would probably be contrary to the Aarhus 
Convention itself as well as the EU Directive implementing the Aarhus Convention, which states that 
environmental NGOs are considered to have an interest in environmental matters.
98
   
 
Granted, there is always access under the law of tort for individuals whose interests were injured, as 
well as for NGOs in terms of the Dutch Civil Code, art. 3.305a.   However, a major drawback for this 
route is the prohibitive costs of proceedings before a Dutch civil court, coupled with the spectre of an 
adverse costs order for the losing party. 
 
3.5.2 Significant changes in the political climate 
 
It is not surprising, given the above, that the number of cases before the Administrative Law Division 
of the Council of State has declined.
99
  In many instances, it is simply not possible any more to 
approach this court, with its relatively fast, cheap and simple procedure. At a stroke (as explained in 
par 3.4.1 above), by taking environmental decision-making away from local authorities and making 
it a national directive-driven imperative, no appeal is possible against 75% of all installations. 
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On top of that, two other issues may have influenced the decline in environmental cases.
100
  The first 
setback occurred when an employee of the Vereniging Milieuoffensief, up to then a very active and 
effective environmental NGO, assassinated Pim Fortuyn, the leader of a right-wing political party.  
This led to the virtual halt of all the Vereniging Milieuoffensief‟s legal activities since.  The second 
setback is the realization by NGOs that court victories in environmental matters are often pyrrhic:  
More often than not, the grant of a permit is set aside by the court on mere technical terms.  The 
applicant then rectifies the technical aspect of its application and the development goes ahead 
anyway.
101
 
 
3.6 Case law dealing with environmental rights 
 
In the Netherlands with its mainly civil law tradition, the significance of case law of course differs 
from that in a common law system such as is followed in South Africa. Nevertheless, case law 
(jurisprudentie) is recognised as an important source of Dutch constitutional law.  It is also important 
to note that by acceding to the Treaty of Rome, the Netherlands has recognized the legal authority of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and therewith the right of individual petition.  
Increasingly the judgements of the ECtHR have required adjustments of Dutch law, including 
constitutional law.
 102
 .
103
    For this reason court findings from national as well as European courts 
will be looked at, but restricted to only a few landmark cases. 
 
3.6.1 Administrative Law Case on EU Habitats Directive (Cricetus cricetus)
 104
 
 
Around the turn of the century an important case relating to environmental governance came before 
the Dutch courts.  A combination of citizens‟ groups and environmental NGOs opposed the proposed 
development of land comprising the habitat of a protected hamster species in terms of EU 
conservation law.
105
 It was decided by the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State that 
the competent authorities in the Netherlands had not, as required by the EU directives, rightfully 
applied the relevant derogation clauses in that they failed to demonstrate: (1) that there were 
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satisfactory alternatives (to destroying the habitat of the protected species); (2) that the derogation 
was not detrimental to the maintenance of the populations of the species at a favourable conservation 
status in their natural range; (3) and that the derogation was necessary for an imperative reason of 
overriding public interest (the employment data relied on was dated, for example.)
106
   
 
This case, and its successors in the District, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court, had an enormous 
impact on all types of development projects throughout the country, making it clear that EU 
directives such as these had to be carefully applied when making environmental developmental 
decisions.
 107
 
 
3.6.2 Civil Law Case on EU Nitrates Directive 
 
Commencing in the early 1990s, the Dutch authorities were embroiled in a dispute concerned the 
non-implementation by the Dutch government of the European Directive concerning the Protection 
of Waters against Pollution Caused by Nitrates from Agricultural Sources (Nitrates Directive).
108
  
After requests by the European Commission as well as national environmental NGOs directed to the 
government to implement the directive was ignored, Dutch NGOs filed a lawsuit in 1999 against the 
government for not having implemented the Nitrates Directive.  Their suit was successful in the 
District Court,
109
 but on appeal was overturned in the Court of Appeal.
110
  Among others,
111
 the court 
agreed with the State‟s argument that implementing the Directive would have necessitated an 
amendment of a national statute (the Animal Manure Act
112
) or the enactment of new legislation.  
Strictly following the separation of powers doctrine, the Court stated that this was therefore a matter 
for the government to decide and not for the Courts.   Upon referral by the NGOs, the Dutch Supreme 
Court agreed with the Appeal Court‟s interpretation.113   
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This decision provides proof for the contention that administrative as well as civil courts in the 
Netherlands „…tend to only marginally test government decisions, leaving them as much room as 
possible, within the limits of the law, to set their own policies.‟114 
 
Subsequently, in 2003, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) condemned the Netherlands for its non-
implementation of the Nitrates Directive.
115
 
 
3.6.3 Standing of NGOs: Article 2:1(3) GALA 
 
In Stichting Openbare Ruimte
116
 the appellant was an environmental NGO dedicated to promoting a 
healthy and sustainable environment and good spatial planning.  As such its stated aims included 
„striving towards achieving a sustainable living environment for all living beings…local, national and 
global.‟117  The Administrative Law Division of the Council of State had to decide whether the NGO 
had standing to bring an action in terms of GALA; in other words, whether it could be considered an 
„interested party‟ in terms of art. 1.2 of GALA.   
 
To recoup: Article 1:2 of GALA states that an interested party means the person whose interest is 
directly affected by an order.  Subsection 3 of art. 1:2 GALA states that the interests of NGOs are 
deemed to include the „general and collective interests which they specially represent in accordance 
with their objectives and as evidenced by their actual activities.‟   
 
The court examined the stated aim of the NGO, as well as its actual activities.  In doing so, it 
interpreted the concept of „actual activities‟ very restrictively.118  It came to the conclusion that, in 
addition to the very wide aims and objectives stated above, its actual activities, namely expressing 
views and bringing actions relating to the environment before courts, did not amount to the protection 
of a public interest.
119
  The court therefore found that the NGO was not an „interested party‟ and had 
no standing before it.   
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This decision has been criticised as restricting access of environmental NGOs to the courts without 
an express mandate from the legislature, and moreover without applying sound legal arguments.
120
 
 
3.7 The European Influence 
 
From the above it is clear that the trend in the Netherlands is to increasingly restrict access to 
environmental adjudication.  How does the Netherlands‟ accession to the Aarhus convention impact 
on this?  The preamble to the Aarhus convention
121
 adopted by the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) states that „every person has the right to live in an environment 
adequate to his or her well-being and the duty, both individually and in association with others, to 
protect and improve the environment for the benefit of present and future generations‟.   
 
It has been observed that the Aarhus convention is the most far-reaching manifestation to date of 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, because convention parties pledge to „…introduce laws that 
provide rights of access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice 
in environmental matters.‟122  Furthermore, the parties to the Convention are required to generally 
provide for the recognition of and support to environmental NGOs. 123   However, it must be 
remembered that as far as access to environmental justice is concerned, this convention provides for 
procedural rather than substantive rights. 
 
Article 9 provides for the right to have environmental decisions legally reviewed.  Parties are 
required to ensure access to justice in cases concerning other relevant provisions of the Convention – 
but, as Ebbesson points out,
124
 this is subject to the caveat „where so provided under national law’.125 
Further, in terms of Article 9(3), each party must also ensure that „where they meet the criteria, if any, 
laid down in its national law, members of the public have access to administrative or judicial 
procedures to challenge acts or omissions by private parties and public authorities which contravenes 
provisions of its national law relating to the environment‟ (own emphasis). Thus, although the 
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objective of the Aarhus Convention is to give the public wide access to justice,
126
 it remains 
essentially a matter for national law to determine what constitutes a sufficient interest.
127
 
 
Although there seems to be agreement amongst commentators that abolition of access to the courts 
under subsection 3 of art. 1:2 GALA is in conflict with the Aarhus convention,
128
 the possibility of 
the convention countering the trend of curtailing access to environmental adjudication in the 
Netherlands is unclear.  An answer may be provided by the ECJ soon: In a Swedish case referred to 
the ECJ
129
 the question of whether participation in environmental decision making by NGOs should 
also ensure access to the courts
130
waits to be answered.   
 
3.8 Summary 
 
In terms of the separation of powers doctrine as followed in the Netherlands, Dutch courts are not 
allowed to carry out constitutional review of Acts of Parliament.  The courts are, however, 
empowered to test all regulations of a lower status than Acts of Parliament against the constitution.
131
  
It is therefore highly significant that in many instances permit granting (where environmental 
objection making is highly likely) have been made subject to national rather than local regulation.
132
  
 
Importantly, Dutch courts are empowered to test the application of Acts of Parliament against all 
directly applicable treaty provisions.
 
It is for this reason that European Union law, with its tendency 
to broaden access to environmental justice, may well be the saving grace for Dutch environmental 
interests.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In both countries examined, it is difficult to amend the constitution – the procedures for amendment 
in both are more cumbersome than that for ordinary Acts of Parliament.
133
  Therefore both can be 
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seen as rigid constitutions.  However, the status of the constitution differs in each country.  In the 
Netherlands, the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers dictate that the 
interpretation of national legislation remains up to parliament, not the judiciary. Acts of Parliament 
cannot be tested against the Constitution,
134
 and the interpretation of the Constitution by the 
legislature is binding upon the administration and judiciary.  In South Africa, it is the other way 
around.  The courts interpret all legislation in accordance with the Constitution and all Acts or parts 
of legislation that cannot be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution are unlawful.  If there is a 
dispute about the interpretation of the Constitution itself, the Constitutional Court has the final say.   
 
In terms of content of the Dutch constitution, the tendency is towards flexibility, and in many 
instances, such as with the environmental right, the Constitution leaves it up to the legislature or the 
executive to set norms.135  There is therefore no directly enforceable environmental right.  Section 21 
of the Dutch constitution is a second or even a third generation right.  In South Africa, Section 24 of 
the Constitution contains the right to a healthy environment as a fundamental human right, arguably 
on a par with other fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights.  The right is directly justiciable and has 
both horizontal and vertical effect. 
 
In the Netherlands, access to the courts in environmental matters used to be very liberal, but has 
recently seen a significant narrowing.  The abolition of the environmental actio popularis, 
amendments to legislation such as GALA, potentially restricting access to environmental justice by 
NGOs, and transferring environmental powers from local to national authorities, have all led to a real 
erosion of the ways in which the Dutch can enforce their environmental rights.  For example, 
procedures in Dutch administrative tribunals are characteristically:
136
  
- Speedy (a final decision, including judicial review, usually takes no longer than one and a half 
years); 
- Informal (Judicial assistance not obligatory and there are no strict formal rules for the 
formulation of complaints or letters of appeal); and 
- Inexpensive.  Furthermore there are government financed bureaus of legal aid, some of which 
specialize in environmental matters.
137
 
However, such access to administrative tribunals are now restricted, with the alternative to go to the 
civil courts in tort.  A suit in the Dutch civil court is expensive and legal representation is necessary.  
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The losing party also faces an adverse costs order.  So in fact, all the advantages listed above are 
negated if a person needs to go to the civil court – which is what restricting access to the 
administrative courts is doing.
138
 
 
Procedural environmental rights, such as the right contained in the Dutch constitution, are not totally 
meaningless. By giving citizens participatory rights in environmental decision-making, they have the 
potential to improve the legitimacy of such decision-making and may furthermore improve the 
quality of environmental decisions because a wider range of interests and concerns are taken into 
account.  Additionally, they may lead to greater scope for public-interest litigation, such as by 
environmental NGOs.
139
  The danger, as can be seen from the discussions above, is that procedural 
environmental rights are easily eroded.  
 
It is therefore submitted that the entrenchment as a fundamental constitutional right following the 
South African model provides a far greater guarantee for the durability and enforceability of 
environmental rights.  It seems as if ensuring that the environmental right is a fundamental right with 
concomitant direct justiciability cuts through the Gordian knot of access to environmental justice.   It 
may well be argued that by giving content to the environmental right and showing a readiness for 
judicial activism in environmental matters in the manner described in paragraph 2.6 above, the South 
African judiciary is making a major contribution to environmental governance.
140
 
 
For South Africa, there are also lessons to be learned from the Dutch example.  Although the South 
African environmental right looks good on paper, in reality it faces many constraints.  The Judiciary 
can only hear those matters that are actually brought before it, and in South Africa, court proceedings 
are prohibitively expensive.  This means a de facto denial of access to environmental justice for the 
poor.  NEMA in section 32(2) does give the court a discretion not to award costs against an 
unsuccessful applicant if the court is of the opinion that the applicant acted reasonably out of a 
concern for the public interest, or in the interest of protecting the environment, and had made due 
effort to use other means reasonably available for obtaining the relief sought.
141
 But this still assumes 
that the matter gets to the court in the first place. 
 
                                                          
138
  Ibid. 66-67. 
139
 Turner (n 4) 6-7. 
140
 Kotzé and Paterson (n 10) 594. 
141
 Section 32(2) was applied in Silvermine Valley Coalition v Sybrand van der Spuy Boerderye 2002 1 SA 478 CPD. 
 30 
There are indications that the South African government are attempting to address possible 
environmental conflicts at the pre-adjudication stage.   Examples include the establishment of the 
Environmental Management Inspectorate and the stated governmental priority of strengthening 
engagement between government and the people by involving citizens in governance and service 
provision.
142
  Nevertheless, massive investment in an overstrained and under-resourced judicial 
system seems vital.  Commentators also find it strange that there is much political support for 
specialist labour, commercial and land reform disputes, but seemingly none for an environmental 
court.
143
 
 
Hayward states that the challenge is  
…not to show that constitutions should say something about the environment, as there is 
little controversy about this; rather, it is to show that the constitutional commitment 
should be to provide for its protection as a fundamental right.  That is to say, the 
provision should not take the form of some less binding constitutional commitment such 
as a statement of social policy; it should not be classed merely among „social rights‟ as 
such a category is sometimes distinguished from fundamental rights proper; and it should 
not provide solely procedural rights (such as the rights to information, access to justice, 
and to environmental decision-making).
144
 
 
The experience in the two countries discussed above bear out the sensibility of this statement.  In the 
Netherlands, where the environmental right is constitutionalised as a second generation right, we are 
witnessing an onslaught on the extent to which the law can be utilised by citizens and NGOs to 
protect the environment.  Indeed, it seems from the analysis that the fact that the Dutch constitution 
contains such a right is barely mentioned, much less utilised in environmental cases.  It also seems 
that a tradition of judicial willingness to accommodate environmental concerns and –NGOs is just 
that: a tradition, open to the vagaries of political expediency.  Without the external modifier in the 
form of EU legislation, the question is wide open as to how far curtailment of environmental access 
to justice in the Netherlands would have progressed. 
 
On the other hand, in a constitutional democracy like South Africa, where all three arms of the trias 
politica are subject to the Constitution as the highest law of the country, a right protected in the 
Constitution as a fundamental, first generation right enjoys privileged status indeed.  All action, be it 
private, governmental, parliamentary, legislative, administrative or otherwise, can be and are tested 
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against the Constitution.  Acts and actions found to be unconstitutional are immediately declared 
unlawful and inoperative.  In this context the main challenges facing the environmental right include 
instances where the right conflicts with other fundamental rights and bread and butter issues such as 
litigation costs and the sophistication of the citizenry.  In this area much can be learned from the 
Dutch system of administrative courts, with their ease of access, low cost, speedy resolution of 
disputes and informal procedures.  A powerful instrument like s 24 of the South African Constitution 
is of little use if the very people who are supposed to be protected by it are barred from using it by 
lack of money. 
 
 
 
